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The financial crises experienced worldwide have contributed to the rising importance of 
corporate governance. South Africa is unique in that it has strong corporate governance 
structures and as a result, it would prove useful to assess the effects of these corporate 
governance structures on critical sectors such as the long-term insurance industry, which is 
the largest insurance industry in Africa. The objective of this study is to examine the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm efficiency in the South African long-term 
insurance industry using data on 73 long-term insurers from 2007 to 2014 in a two-stage 
analysis.  In the first stage, firm efficiency is estimated using the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) bootstrapping technique of Simar and Wilson (2007), which corrects for biases 
associated with non-parametric techniques. In the second stage analysis, the truncated 
bootstrapping regression technique is employed to examine the effect of corporate 
governance on the estimated efficiency scores.  The corporate governance variables used 
were board size, board independence, audit committee size, CEO tenure and audit 
independence, while controlling for firm size, reinsurance usage and leverage.  
The findings indicate that long-term insurers in South Africa operated at approximately 21% 
of their optimal capacity which suggests high levels of inefficiency in the provision of life 
insurance services. The results of the second-stage analysis identify board size, non-executive 
directorship, CEO tenure and audit independence as the significant corporate governance 
indicators that impact on efficiency over the study period.  In addition, firm size, reinsurance 
usage and leverage were also observed to be significantly related to the estimated efficiency 
scores. 
The findings suggest that non-executive directors are not as effective as expected, which may 
be due to a myriad of reasons, such as under-representation on sub-committees, a lack of 
relevant skills, experience or financial expertise. Insurers should use more stringent criteria to 
screen potential non-executive directors and provide training and regular updates to 
adequately capacitate the non-executive directors with the necessary skills and knowledge. 
The positive relationship between CEO tenure and efficiency suggests that frequent CEO 
rotation is not advisable. 
Most of the corporate governance indicators have a negative effect on efficiency, which is not 
the intended effect. This is an indication that corporate governance measures should not be 
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enforced on insurers as a ‘one size fits all’ measure, rather, a focus should be placed on 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
The 2008 financial crisis experienced by the American financial system had a far-reaching 
and significant impact not only in America but on the rest of the world, eventually causing a 
world-wide recession which affected the livelihood of millions of families. Significant sums 
of money were lost and various firms in the financial services sector went bankrupt. Conyon, 
Judge and Michael (2011); and Kirkpatrick (2009), attributed some corporate governance 
failures and weaknesses as a significant contributing factor in triggering the financial crisis. 
This illustrates the significant role that corporate governance can and does play in the 
stability of financial systems and warrants further investigation into the mechanisms and 
effects of corporate governance on various aspects of the financial system.  
The increased focus on corporate governance mechanisms developed over time as firms 
began to separate ownership from control. As firms got larger and larger, management 
actions needed to be monitored to ensure that management was acting in the best interests of 
the firm. This came about through law (through the establishment of fiduciary duty) and 
market forces. Managers were inclined to act in the best interests of the firm for fear of legal 
ramifications or because of market forces, as poorly managed firms provide poor financial 
returns. (Farrar, 1999) 
Over the years, corporate governance has gained great importance in the corporate sector. 
Large-scale international financial scandals involving large, successful companies such as 
Enron, Parmalat, Barings Bank, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and, more 
recently, African Bank in South Africa, have emphasized the need for a set of rules and 
guidelines that ethically govern corporations worldwide. Most of these scandals were due to 
the actions of management and the board of directors.  
The main purpose of a business is to maximise profits for the shareholders of the business, 
and at times directors and management try to do so unethically and/or fraudulently or put 
their own interests above those of the shareholders. As a result, these rules and guidelines 
place specific importance on the actions of directors. The rise of ‘good’ corporate governance 
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has seen the creation and updating of guidelines such as Sarbanes Oxley, King I, II and III 
and the UK Corporate Governance Code.  
In South Africa, the Companies Act of 1979 gave way to the Companies Act of 2008, which 
uses an enlightened shareholder approach that places focus on the protection of stakeholder 
interests, particularly shareholder interests (both minority and majority shareholders). 
Additionally, the Companies Act of 2008 places certain restrictions on the autonomy of 
directors and includes stricter repercussions for directors who breach their responsibilities 
and fiduciary duties (The Companies Act, 2008). In the United States, listed companies must 
comply with Sarbanes-Oxley, while listed companies in South Africa are required to comply 
with the King Reports on corporate governance (JSE Limited, 2012).  
Good corporate governance is of even greater importance in industries that manage large 
sums of the public’s money, such as the pension fund industry and the insurance industry. 
The insurance industry in South Africa is heavily regulated by the Financial Services Board 
(FSB), Short-Term Insurance Act of 1998 (STIA), Long-Term Insurance Act of 1998 
(LTIA), Insurance Laws Amendment Act of 2008 and the Companies Act of 2008. Due to the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009, in which the insurance industry played a significant role, 
additional requirements have been added to the insurance industry regulations (Sibindi, 
2015). Apart from complying with industry regulations, the South African insurance industry 
also adheres to the King III Code on governance (Sibindi, 2015). 
1.2 Problem Definition 
Corporate governance rules and regulations were created with the aim of protecting and 
promoting the interests of stakeholders, more specifically shareholders. The question that 
arises is whether corporate governance has any other tangible benefits or positive side effects. 
Does forcing companies to look after the interests of shareholders help them to meet the main 
objective of a business, which is to maximise shareholder wealth? 
Compliance with corporate governance codes, rules and regulations is an onerous process. 
Directors are mandated to act in the best interests of the shareholders, by increasing 
shareholder wealth. Thus, compliance with corporate governance should not have a negative 
effect on firm efficiency and profitability. If there is a negative relationship between 
corporate governance and firm efficiency, it would mean that directors are protecting 
shareholders’ rights at the expense of shareholder wealth. Thus, it is important to identify the 
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existence and extent of the relationship between corporate governance and firm efficiency. 
This study aims to determine this relationship, from an African perspective, based on the 
long-term insurance market. 
In addition, , the King Code on Corporate Governance is not complied with by all companies 
in South Africa, particularly unlisted companies. The King Code also allows users to apply 
the code or explain non-compliance (The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2009). 
Determining the relationship and the significance of the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm efficiency may result in an increase in compliance, if the relationship is 
found to be significant and positive.  
Furthermore, effective corporate governance rules and requirements may improve the 
running of the day-to-day and long-term operations of the business, thereby influencing the 
performance and efficiency of a business. Therefore, this study focuses on the following 
questions: 
i. What is the level of efficiency in the production of long-term insurance business in 
South Africa? 
ii. Does corporate governance have any effect on the efficiency level of firms in the 
South African long-term insurance industry? 
1.3 Research Objectives and Hypotheses  
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm efficiency in the South African long-term insurance sector.  The specific objectives 
include; 
i. To estimate efficiency in the long-term insurance market in South Africa 
ii. To examine the empirical relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
efficiency in the long-term insurance market in South Africa.  
The research hypotheses are: 
H0: There is no relationship between corporate governance and firm efficiency in the South 
African long-term insurance industry. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between corporate governance and firm efficiency in the 
South African long-term insurance industry.  
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1.4 Justification of the Study 
The financial sector plays an important role in facilitating economic growth and attracting 
foreign investment flows. Financial development has a significant positive effect on 
economic growth, especially in developing countries (Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016). Thus, an 
efficient and well-developed financial system is especially important for a developing 
country like South Africa. Furthermore, insurance sector growth and development have been 
shown to have a significant positive effect on economic growth and savings mobilization in 
developing countries, with Alhassan and Biekpe (2016) finding a long-term relationship 
between insurance market activities and economic growth for South Africa. Economic 
growth is vital for the development and advancement of developing countries, particularly in 
Africa, whose economies are often characterised by sluggish or non-existent growth. Thus, 
factors affecting the efficiency, profitability and sustainability of insurance companies are of 
great importance and warrant detailed research. (Estrada, Park, & Ramayandi, 2010) 
(Masoud & Hardaker, 2012) (Balago, 2014) (Oke, 2012) (Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016) 
(Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015) 
Most research focusing on corporate governance and efficiency relates to industrial firms, 
with limited research examining the relationship between efficiency and corporate 
governance in the insurance market (Huang, Lai, McNamara, & Wang, 2011). Furthermore, 
most of studies that do investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
efficiency focus on European, American and Asian countries. There is limited research 
available on this topic from an African perspective and it must be noted that the governance 
structures and insurance markets in Africa differ from those in other parts of the world. Thus, 
a study on the corporate governance/efficiency relationship within an African context would 
be more relevant for African insurers in determining the most effective corporate governance 
structures and for investors by assisting them to make investments in firms and sectors that 
may yield profitable returns. (Ntim, 2013) (Hsu & Petchsakulwong, 2010) (Cremers & Nair, 
2005) 
Additionally, South Africa is unique in that it has strong corporate governance structures 
which would consequently prove useful in assessing the effects of the structures on critical 
sectors, such as the long-term insurance industry. Further research in this area is therefore not 
only useful to long-term insurance industry managers and regulators, but also to academic 
discourse and policies in the fields of corporate governance and insurance. 
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The focus is on South Africa for this study it has the largest insurance market in Africa, with 
one of the highest insurance penetration rates in the world, particularly in the long-term 
insurance market. (Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016) (Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015) (KPMG Report, 
2014) 
In conclusion, determining the effect of corporate governance on firm efficiency in the South 
African long-term insurance industry may also be beneficial to investors and shareholders in 
the insurance sector and to assist investors to make better informed and financially beneficial 
decisions.  
1.5 Organisation of the Study 
Chapter 1 of this study presented the background of the study and introduced the problem 
statement, research objectives and hypotheses and justification of the study.  
Chapter 2 presents a summary and critical synthesis of the literature and relevant research 
associated with efficiency and corporate governance, including existing theories and 
frameworks.  
Chapter 3 presents the methodology and procedures used for data collection and analysis. 
Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the data and presentation of the results.  
Chapter 5 offers a conclusive summary and discussion of the study’s findings, policy 







CHAPTER TWO:  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an overview of the long-term insurance market in South Africa. It also 
discusses the corporate governance framework in South Africa as well as the corporate 
governance theories. Furthermore, the section discusses the approaches in estimation 
efficiency in insurance markets and reviews the empirical literature on corporate governance 
and efficiency in insurance markets.  
2.2 The Long-term Insurance Industry: South Africa 
This section provides an overview of the long-term insurance industry in South Africa, 
beginning with a discussion on the legislative and regulatory developments in the South 
African insurance industry, followed by a discussion on the South African insurance market 
and industry players. 
2.2.1 Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
The insurance industry in South Africa is heavily regulated by the Financial Services Board 
(FSB) based on the Short-Term Insurance Act of 1998 (STIA), Long-Term Insurance Act of 
1998 (LTIA), Insurance Laws Amendment Act of 2008 (ILAA), Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act (FAIS) and the Companies Act of 2008. (Sibindi, 2015) 
Due to the 2008 financial crisis, there have been several regulatory reforms in the South 
African insurance industry, aimed at ensuring the financial stability of the insurance industry. 
The reforms are based on the Twin Peaks model; with the ‘twin peaks’ being financial 
stability and enhanced market conduct regulations (Sibindi, 2015).  
The Twin Peaks system was proposed to further regulate the industry on improving financial 
sector stability and protection of customers and is based on the 2011 government policy 
paper, ‘A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better’, which identified weaknesses in 
the South African financial sector based on lessons learnt from the 2008 financial crisis. An 
additional factor for the introduction of the Twin Peaks system is the fragmented nature of 
financial sector regulations, for each individual industry. The Twin Peaks system will aim to 
create comprehensive regulations that bring together all the various industry regulations to 
create overarching and comprehensive oversight of the financial sector. Currently, the 
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Financial Services Board (FSB) oversees the insurance industry which, under the proposed 
Twin Peaks system will cease to exist, and be replaced by two new authorities, the Financial 
Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) and the Prudential Authority (PA). The FSCA will act as 
an independent entity while the PA will operate as part of the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB), which will have financial stability oversight (National Treasury, 2014). 
The Financial Sector Regulation Bill (FSRB), the Insurance Bill of 2016, the Retail 
Distribution Review (RDR), Treating Customers Fairly Framework (TCFF) and Solvency, 
Assessment and Management (SAM) have been the most significant developments in the 
insurance industry.  
i. The Financial Sector Regulation Bill (FSRB) 
The main purpose of the FSRB is to provide the framework and processes required to enforce 
the Twin Peaks system. Apart from creating the two new regulatory authorities, the FSCA 
and PA, the FSRB identifies the objectives, responsibilities and powers of these two 
authorities over the financial sector and the phases and time periods during which these 
changes will take place. (National Treasury, 2014). 
In the early stages of the implementation of the FSRB, the current insurance industry 
regulations, such as the LTIA, will remain in place but oversight of these regulations will 
move from the FSB to the new regulatory authorities, the FSCA and PA. In the later stages of 
the implementation of the FSRB, some of the current insurance industry regulations relating 
to market conduct will be replaced by more comprehensive non-industry-specific regulations. 
Additionally, under the FSRB, the PA and FSCA may issue new standards governing the 
entire financial sector as they see fit. The FSRB views the different industries that constitute 
the South African financial sector as extremely interconnected. As a result, the PA, FSCA, 
SARB and the National Credit Regulator (NCR) will not function wholly independently of 
each other but as interconnecting, collaborative and co-operative units. (National Treasury, 
2014) 
The Prudential Authority will be mandated with prudential oversight, to improve the safety 
and soundness of financial institutions with two goals:  
- Protecting customers (in the case of insurers, policyholders) against the risk of South 
African financial institutions being unable to discharge their obligations 




The Financial Sector Conduct Authority will be mandated to protect financial customers with 
three goals: 
- Ensuring fair treatment of financial customers 
- Improving financial system integrity and efficiency 
- Improving customer financial literacy through the provision of financial education 
programmes  
 
ii. The Insurance Bill (2016) (IB) 
The objective of the Insurance Bill is to provide a framework for the supervision of the South 
African insurance industry that is consistent with international standards and best practice. 
Furthermore, the Insurance Bill replaces the parts of the current LTIA and STIA relating to 
prudential supervision. The bill, tabled in parliament in January 2016, forms part of the Twin 
Peaks system and is complementary to the FSRB. The Insurance Bill includes a chapter on 
governance, which requires an insurer to implement an effective governance framework that 
protects the interests of policyholders. The governance framework requires the appointment 
of an auditor and an audit committee consisting of independent industry experts. The 
Insurance Bill is linked to the Companies Act of 2008 and borrows key aspects of the King 
Reports (Minister of Finance, 2016). 
The framework aims to: 
- Lower barriers to entry into the South African insurance industry, encouraging 
increased participation and competition 
- Improve consumer protection 
- Improve the supervision and integrity of the South African insurance industry  
- Promote the formation of regulated and well-capitalised insurers (Minister of Finance, 
2016) 
 
iii. Treating Customers Fairly Framework (TCFF) 
The Treating Customers Fairly Framework was drafted by the FSB in response to the 
publication of ‘A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South Africa Better’ by the Department of 
National Treasury and focuses on consumer protection and market conduct. As a key part of 
the Twin Peaks system, the TCFF will serve as the main framework for the fair treatment of 
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financial services customers. The TCFF was created in response to the need for a 
comprehensive, overarching and consistent consumer regulation framework for the financial 
sector, addressing the information asymmetry between consumers and firms and the unique 
risks inherent in financial products and services. The TCFF has no formal start date and will 
instead be gradually implemented, with the expectation that financial sector firms should 
currently be applying some of the main principles of the TCFF. (Financial Services Board, 
2014) 
The TCFF involves 6 outcomes: 
1. Culture and Governance: The TCFF must be a central part of the firm’s 
governance and risk management frameworks and corporate culture 
2. Product Design: The design of products must meet the needs of specific groups of 
customers and must accordingly be marketed to those specific groups  
3. Disclosure: All necessary and relevant information must be timeously and clearly 
disclosed to customers at all times 
4. Suitable advice: Appropriate, fair and customer-specific financial advice must be 
provided to customers 
5. Performance expectations and service: Services received must be of an 
internationally acceptable standard and must be consistent with advertisements or 
claims made by the firm to the customer 
6. Claims, complaints and switches: Customers should not face unreasonable 
difficulties in switching between products and firms, laying complaints and 
submitting claims (Financial Services Board, 2014) 
 
iv. Retail Distribution Review (RDR) 
In 2014, the FSB published the Retail Distribution Review, which proposes substantial 
changes to the regulatory framework for the distribution of financial products to financial 
customers. The RDR takes direction from the Treating Customers Fairly framework. The 
RDR proposes a ‘consistent approach to the distribution of investment products in the 
insurance sector’ and retirement savings products. The RDR promotes and supports the 
provision of appropriate and fair financial advice to financial customers; fair long-term 
customer outcomes; customer financial education and knowledge; and, fair and reasonable 
prices for financial advice and intermediary services (Financial Services Board, 2014). 
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v. Solvency, Assessment and Management (SAM) 
The purpose of the Solvency, Assessment and Management Project is to provide a regulatory 
framework for the insurance industry. The project was undertaken by the Financial Services 
Board with input from the South African Insurance industry and is also a result of the Twin 
Peaks reforms. The SAM framework will largely be enacted through the Insurance Bill, and 
supported by additional legislation, such as the ‘Governance and Risk Management 
Framework for Insurers’ (GRMFI), which has been effective since 1 April 2015. 
The Governance and Risk Management Framework for Insurers contains requirements for 
insurance relating to governance and risk, such as the composition of the board of directors; 
roles and responsibilities of directors; board of directors’ sub-committees; risk management 
systems; and, internal controls. The SAM framework also aims to improve risk management 
within the South African insurance industry. (Financial Services Board, 2015) 
The SAM framework consists of: 
- Governance and Risk Management: This is mostly covered by the Governance and 
Risk Management Framework for Insurers but will also include risk appetite 
requirements, requirements for the head of actuarial control and ORSA requirements. 
- Financial Soundness Requirements: This covers group solvency calculations and 
requirements; valuation of insurance participations; credit risk parameters; contract 
boundaries for reinsurers; and, the calculation of operational risk, amongst others. 
- Reporting Requirements: This provides reporting templates to be used for insurers, 
and forms to be used for Insurance Act applications, notifications and exemptions. 
(Financial Services Board, 2015) 
 
Due to the significant changes that the SAM framework brings to the insurance industry, the 
implementation period is protracted to provide sufficient time for insurers to fully comply 
with the new regulations. A trial compliance run, named the Comprehensive Parallel Run, 
occurred in 2015, whereby insurers provided reports based on the financial soundness 
requirements using the SAM reporting templates and requirements. The FSB itself has also 
undergone various training programmes to better equip the board in regulating the insurance 
industry under the SAM framework. The SAM framework has an implementation date of 
1 January 2017. (Financial Services Board, 2015). 
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2.2.2 Stylized Facts: The Long-term Insurance Market  
The South African insurance industry is clearly in a major transition phase, which will have 
significant impact on the state of the insurance industry. These changes will result in a more 
stable and efficient industry, bringing the South African insurance industry in line with 
international standards and best practice, which is of great importance in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis. The recent regulatory and legislative developments place significant 
emphasis on risk management, governance and consumer/stakeholder protection, which are 
also the cornerstones of the King Reports and the Companies Act of 2008, and which insurers 
are expected to comply with. (KPMG, 2014) (Financial Services Board, 2014) 
The South African long-term insurance market has experienced significant growth in recent 
years, experiencing growth of 19.7% in 2013 and 14.5% in 2014. The South African 
long-term insurance industry is expected to grow from a total value of $51.2 billion in 2014 
to $85.6 billion in 2019, representing growth of 67%. (KPMG Report, 2014) (KPMG, 2014)  
2.2.2.1 Industry Players 
The total number of long-term insurers in the South African market has not varied 
significantly during the 2007 to 2014 period, as shown in Table 2.1. The number of primary 
insurers and reinsurers remained relatively unchanged, with 72 primary insurers and 6 
reinsurers in 2007 increasing to only 73 primary insurers and 7 reinsurers in 2014. It can be 
argued that the increased complexity and extent of regulatory requirements may create a 
barrier to entry for potential market entrants, as they may baulk at the administration and 
costs of compliance, and the costs of non-compliance through sanctions and fines. (KPMG, 
2014). 
Table 2.1: Firms in the Life Insurance Market (2007-2014) 
  Primary Insurers Reinsurers Total 
2007 72 6 78 
2008 76 6 82 
2009 78 7 85 
2010 80 7 87 
2011 80 7 87 
2012 79 7 86 
2013 74 7 81 
2014 73 7 80 
Source: Extracts from FSB Annual Reports 2007 to 2014 
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2.2.2.2 Classes of Policies  
Firms in the long-term market are registered to underwrite six different classes of policies in 
assistance, life, disability, health, fund and sinking fund. Table 2.2 presents the premium 
distribution across the six classes of policies from 2007 to 2014.  
The premium distribution is focused on life and fund policies. Life insurance and funds 
constituted 94% of the premium distribution in 2007, decreasing slightly to 92% in 2014. 
Although it is not a legal requirement for home loan applicants to take out life insurance, 
most South African banks require applicants to have life insurance as a condition of the home 
loan agreement. In 2011, 9 million South Africans were homeowners, with 13% of those 
homes not yet paid off.  As more and more South Africans enter the housing market, the 
distribution of life insurance premiums may increase, as evidenced by the slight increase 
from 2007 to 2017, while fund premiums decreased from 48% in 2007 to 45% in 2014. (Stats 
SA, 2012) 
Various regulations exist to separate health insurance policies from the medical scheme 
industry, to prevent direct competition between these insurers and medical schemes, as 
medical schemes are non-profit organisations while insurers are profit-seeking. In 2013, only 
18.4% of South Africans was on medical aid, mainly due to a lack of affordability. Thus, 
health insurance products are affordable to the small percentage of the South African 
population who already have medical aid. This appears to explain the low percentage of 
premiums attributed to health insurance policies. (KPMG, 2014) (Stats SA, 2014). 
Table 2.2: Distribution of Premiums across Classes of Policy (2007-2014) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Assistance 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 1.8% 1.7% 
 Life 45.9% 44.0% 38.5% 45.7% 46.8% 46.2% 46.8% 46.7% 
 Disability 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.7% 1.8% 1.7% 2.0% 1.9% 
 Health 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 1.2% 1.1% 1.2% 1.0% 1.1% 
 Fund 48.4% 51.1% 55.5% 46.8% 45.3% 46.9% 45.3% 44.9% 
 Sinking Fund 2.0% 1.4% 2.5% 2.7% 3.2% 2.4% 3.2% 3.2% 
Source: Extracts from FSB Annual Reports 2007 to 2014 
The long-term insurance sector comprises life insurance (65.4%) and pensions/annuities 
(34.6%). The sector is characterised by high competition and rivalry, with 38.9% of the 
market controlled by four large insurers; Old Mutual Life Assurance Company, Sanlam Life 
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Insurance Limited, MMI Holdings and Liberty Group Limited and the remaining 61.1% 
controlled by a variety of other firms. (MarketLine, 2015) 
2.2.2.3 Classes of Business 
Table 2.3 presents the net premium distribution across the various classes of business of the 
long-term insurance industry in South Africa. Investments account for most of the premiums 
in the industry, with a minimal decrease of 3% from 65% in 2011 to 62% in 2014. Risks, 
being the second largest business class, accounts for 19% of premiums over the 2011–2014 
period. Annuities and Universal Life account for the remaining premiums, with a gradual 
increase from 12% to 16% over the 2011–2014 period for annuities, while universal life 
decreased by 2% during the period under review. The growth in annuities appears to come 
from the decline in investments.  
Table 2.3: Distribution of Premiums across Classes of Business (2011-2014) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Investments 65% 65% 64% 62% 
Risks 18% 19% 19% 19% 
Annuities 12% 12% 14% 16% 
Universal Life 5% 4% 4% 3% 
Source: Extracts from FSB Annual Reports 2011 to 2014 
2.2.2.4 Financial Performance 
Table 2.4 presents the financial performance of South African long-term insurers. Firms in 
the long-term market have experienced notable growth in premiums over the 2007–2014 
period, with an average annual growth of 9%. Premium growth peaked in 2008, 2013 and 
2014 at 17%, 14% and 15% respectively. Total income increased significantly between 2007 
and 2013, showing a 66% increase driven equally by an increase in net premiums and 
investment income. 
The growth in income is extremely positive considering South Africa’s sluggish growth in 
recent years. It would be expected that as consumers’ disposable income decreases, their 
ability and/or willingness to pay for insurance may decrease, resulting in lower premium 
income due to lapsed or cancelled policies. Although the long-term insurance market has 
experienced this, it has been mainly in the low-end premiums, thus there has been limited 
effect on insurers’ income. Total income would be expected to continue to increase, as the 
industry still has significant potential for growth, with only 16% of South African adults 
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having life insurance in 2013, increasing from 12% in 2012. (World Bank, 2017) (KPMG 
Report, 2014) (KPMG, 2014) (FinMark Trust, 2013) 
Table 2.4: Financial Performance: Incomes and Expenses (2007-2014) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Income 
        
Net Premiums 225634 264363 294873 262351 283242 324617 373687 411532 
Investment income 178208 13397 78894 189173 133626 239126 290927 283834 
Other income 8349 8810 9774 10431 12367 16135 21 690 19948 
Total  412191 286570 383541 461955 429235 579878 686304 715314 
Expenditure 
        
Benefits 228320 262891 278643 242297 236145 274464 324485 355801 
Management expenses 19247 21201 24581 27314 25886 29252 32222 31933 
Commission  10829 11363 11776 12503 14332 16296 18489 19337 
Other expenses 6801 2713 15986 3660 8375 7387 10895 8344 
 Total  265197 298168 330986 285774 284738 327399 386091 415414 
Excess income over 
expenditure 
146994 -11598 52555 176181 144497 252479 300213 299900 
Source: Extracts from FSB Annual Reports 2007 to 2014 
2.3 The Corporate Governance Framework in South Africa  
The corporate governance theories represent the cornerstone of corporate governance, as 
corporate governance frameworks aim to protect the interests of all stakeholders and 
minimise principal-agent problems and issues of moral hazard. The corporate governance 
structure of South African firms is regulated by the King I, II and III Reports as well as the 
Companies Act of 2008, which aims to minimise or eliminate agency costs by aligning the 
interests of managers with those of stakeholders, through punitive measures, methods of 
encouragement or policies and regulations. 
The King Reports on Corporate Governance, which represent South Africa’s corporate 
governance framework, have undergone three phases. The King Reports embrace the 
stakeholder theory and indicate minimum standards of good corporate governance based on 
seven characteristics: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, 
fairness and social responsibility. These corporate governance mechanisms, by decreasing 
agency costs and promoting the interests of stakeholders, would be expected to maximise 




The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) published the King I Report on 
Corporate Governance on 29 November 1994. This first report was internationally recognised 
as the most comprehensive and inclusive approach to corporate governance available at that 
time. King I proposed an integrated approach to corporate governance that accounted for the 
needs of all stakeholders. The first King Report focused on the need for a good system of 
corporate governance in companies where ownership and management were separate. The 
report defines a good corporate governance system as one which attempts to meet the needs 
of different stakeholder groups, while still ensuring that the best interests of the company and 
its shareholders are prioritised. In preparing the King Report, the King Committee looked at 
the findings of the United Kingdom Cadbury Committee, which reported on corporate 
governance mechanisms in 1992. The King Report went further than the Cadbury Committee 
report by including a Code of Ethical Practice and looking at corporate governance from a 
South African perspective (e.g. shortage of adequately qualified/skilled directors and 
affirmative action). King I addressed five critical areas of corporate governance, being 
directors, audit, stakeholder links, ethics and compliance. These areas covered the functions 
and responsibilities of directors, the role and appointment of external and internal auditors, 
ethical business practices and firms’ compliance with the report, amongst other things. A 
significant difference between King I and the later King reports is the focus on listed 
companies and public entities, with the later King Reports widening the applicability of the 
report to a wider variety of companies. (Institute of Directors of Southern Africa, 1994) 
(Institute of Directors of Southern Africa, 2002) 
The King II Report on Corporate Governance came into effect on 1 March 2002 and served 
as an improved and updated version of King I. The most significant aspect of King II was the 
move from single, bottom-line reporting (profit-focused reporting) to triple bottom-line 
reporting, which looks at the economic, social and environmental aspects of a company’s 
activities. The King II Report was applicable only to JSE listed companies, banks, financial 
and insurance entities and certain public-sector enterprises. (Institute of Directors of Southern 
Africa, 2002) 
The third report on corporate governance, King III, represented an important change for 
corporate governance in South Africa, because of the Companies Act of 2008. The King III 
Report was released in September 2009 and became effective on 1 March 2010. The King III 
Report considers the Companies Act of 2008, which became effective on 1 May 2011. The 
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Companies Act makes certain governance mechanisms legally compulsory, with failure to 
comply having legal ramifications for a business. The King Reports are based on a ‘comply 
or explain’ approach, but due to the requirements of the Companies Act, the King III Report 
also indicates governance elements and principles that must be complied with, as 
non-compliance with areas covered by the Companies Act can no longer simply be explained 
away. (The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2009) 
Furthermore, the King III Report also covers areas that were not previously covered by King 
II: 
- IT governance: The prevalence of e-commerce, online trading and electronic 
communication poses significant risks for businesses and should therefore be 
adequately managed and controlled through adequate risk management and 
governance mechanisms. 
- Business rescue: Before the Companies Act of 2008, South Africa’s legislation did 
not focus on the rescue of businesses in financial difficulties but rather placed much 
focus on their liquidation. The Companies Act of 2008 acknowledges the 
contributions that businesses make to the South African economy and, as a result, 
companies in financial difficulties that are still economically viable should first go 
through a business rescue process before considering liquidation. King III requires the 
board of directors to be aware of and conversant in business rescue legislation, 
processes and requirements. 
- Fundamental and affected transactions: The previous King Reports did not discuss 
fundamental and affected transactions. However, fundamental and affected 
transactions are now covered in detail in the Companies Act. Thus, King III includes a 
section that covers mergers, amalgamations and acquisitions, as directors need to be 
aware of these requirements in order to adequately discharge their duties. 
- Applicability to all businesses: Unlike the previous reports, the King III Report 
applies to all companies in the public, private and non-profit sectors. 
- Integrated Reporting: The King III Report places greater emphasis on integrated 
reporting and now includes integrated reporting as part of the financial reporting of 
the business, as they had previously been viewed as separate areas. (The Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, 2009) 
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The King IV Report on Corporate Governance was released on 1 November 2016 but is only 
expected to take effect during the latter part of 2017. King IV aims to simplify the 
interpretation of the King Reports in order to make them more useful and applicable for non-
profit organisations, private companies and public-sector entities. The most significant 
difference between the King III and IV Reports is that the King IV Report is expected to be 
more of an inclusive and collaborative effort, considering the needs of all the users of the 
reports, and not just those of listed companies. Consequently, the King IV Report will focus 
on principles and will clearly differentiate between principles and practice recommendations, 
as most of the practice recommendations are more suited for listed companies while the 
principles espoused by the practice recommendations can be applied by all types of 
businesses. (Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2016) 
A discussion on two important aspects of corporate governance (and the King Reports) 
follows: 
i. Board Composition 
Board composition represents an important component of corporate governance. The King 
Report and Fama and Jensen (1983) state that effective boards should be composed mainly of 
external, independent directors. Additionally, the positions of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and Chairman should be held by two separate individuals, with the position of chairman 
being held by an independent director. This prevents the CEO from dominating the board and 
minimises the principal-agent problem, as the independent directors have no other incentive 
but to act in the interests of the shareholders. (The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 
2009)  
ii. Audit Committees 
The King Reports and the Companies Act of 2008 place great importance on the size and 
composition of audit committees. Audit committees provide significant assistance to the 
board of directors in discharging its responsibilities and have oversight over financial 
reporting, risk management and regulatory compliance. An audit committee consisting of 
appropriately qualified directors would be expected to improve the effectiveness of the 
committee. (The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2009) (The Companies Act, 2008) 
 
18 
2.4 Corporate Governance Theories 
Shareholder Theory 
Shareholder theory states that the only role of management is to serve the interests of the 
shareholders. Thus, all resources must be utilised to effectively maximise shareholder wealth. 
Based on this theory, the interests of other stakeholders should be of no importance, and other 
stakeholders may receive benefit inadvertently because of shareholder wealth maximisation. 
(Heath & Norman, 2004) (Hendry, 2001) 
Agency Theory 
An agency relationship arises between two parties when one party (agent) is designated to act 
on behalf of the other party (principal), with significant decision-making authority being 
delegated to the agent. Agency relationships are usually contractual, with a common agency 
relationship being one between employer and employee. Agency theory in relation to 
corporate governance addresses the problems caused by the agency relationship, such as the 
principal – agent problem and moral hazard. In business, the principal – agent problem often 
refers to the relationship between shareholders (principal) and company directors and 
managers (agents). Company directors and managers are expected to act in the best interests 
of shareholders, by maximising shareholder wealth. However, it is often found that company 
executives tend to act in their own best interests, often to the detriment of shareholders and 
other stakeholders. If the interests of the executives and shareholders are not aligned, the 
actions in the interests of the executives may negatively affect shareholder wealth and value, 
which is often the case. This difference between the agent’s decisions and decisions that 
maximise shareholder wealth results in a residual loss, that can often be quantified, called 
agency costs. Moral hazard arises when one party makes extremely risky decisions knowing 
that it is insulated from the negative effects of the risk and the other party will have to bear 
the costs instead. This is oftentimes linked to the principal – agent problem as shareholders 
bear the risk of poor management decisions (Ross, 1973) (Heath & Norman, 2004) (Jenson & 
Meckling, 1976) (McColgan, 2001). 
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory builds on the shareholder theory, stating that in addition to shareholders, a 
company has a responsibility to a wider group of stakeholders, such as communities, other 
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firms and employees. A stakeholder, in this context, would represent any individual, group or 
entity that would be affected by the actions of the business. This theory is commonly used to 
support corporate social responsibility. Stakeholder theory represents a balancing act, 
whereby the needs of the shareholders must be met, whilst also meeting the needs of other 
stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) (Heath & Norman, 2004). 
Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship is a contrast to agency theory and theorises that company executives generally 
have interests that are aligned with those of shareholders. The theory states that on their own, 
company executives will choose to serve the interests of shareholders, deciding that serving 
the interests of the shareholders will ultimately be to their benefit. This occurs because 
maximising shareholder wealth requires profit and performance maximisation, which benefits 
and protects the careers, reputations, salaries and job security of those executives. (Fama, 
1980) (Cannella, Daily, & Dalton, 2003). 
2.5 Efficiency Concept 
Efficiency as a concept belongs to the board measures of performance assessment. The 
efficiency concept involves the determination of desired output based on total inputs or the 
required inputs to produce a pre-determined output. The concept measures the productivity of 
a business and how efficiently it is using its assets or inputs.  The efficiency concept is of 
particular importance to the insurance industry, as it relates to a core function of insurers, 
which is the underwriting of insurance policies. The underwriting of insurance policies 
requires the risk assessment of individuals, businesses and assets, and to avoid significant 
losses, insurers need to carefully perform the risk assessment and underwriting process. Thus, 
improved risk assessment and underwriting processes would be expected to minimise the 
incurred losses, which would result in improved efficiency. Consequently, the effect of 
underwriting processes and risk management on the efficiency of South African insurers 
represents a viable area of further study. (Cummins & Weiss, 1998) (Cummins, Tennyson, & 
Weiss, 1999) 
Performance assessment tools are classified into financial and economic performance 
indicators. Traditionally, the evaluation of performance in the financial services industry has 
favoured the use of financial indicators in the accounting ratios. Although commonly used, 
ratio analysis as a performance measure has various disadvantages: It is difficult to determine 
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the value that represents an optimal ratio; ratios can be easily manipulated through the 
manipulation of the financial statements; and company ratios on their own do not allow for 
meaningful analysis unless compared to other firms in the industry or industry averages. 
When applied to the insurance industry, different accounting and actuarial practices used by 
various insurance firms can make comparisons difficult. Many researchers view efficiency 
methodologies as superior to financial ratio analysis, as performance measurement can be 
summarised into one value, which determines whether a firm is efficient or not.  Cummins 
and Weiss (1998) state that efficiency ‘refers to how well firms are performing relative to the 
existing technology in the industry’. Applied to insurance markets, efficiency refers to the 
usage of inputs (resources) to produce a firm’s outputs (revenue, number and/or value of 
policies and/or premiums). (Calabrese & Rafferty, 2003) (Kader, Adams & Hardwick, 2010) 
(Cummins & Weiss, 1998). 
 
2.5.1 Efficiency Estimation Techniques  
Efficiency analysis can be divided into two main approaches, the econometric approach and 
the mathematical programming approach. This section discusses the two approaches in 
estimation firm efficiency. 
 Parametric Techniques 
The econometric approach can be further divided into four approaches: the stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA), the distribution-free approach (DFA) and the thick frontier approach (TFA), 
with SFA being the most used approach. Parametric techniques are characterised by the 
assumption of the inefficiency terms distribution, which Seiford and Thrall (1990) argue may 
be the technique’s main disadvantage. (Eling & Luhnen, 2010) 
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
The SFA uses a composed error model with asymmetrically distributed inefficiencies and 
symmetrically distributed random error terms, allowing for the estimation of inefficiency 
while accounting for random noise.  The method utilises regression with two error terms, one 




Distribution-free Approach (DFA) 
The DFA owes its name to the lack of structure of distributions, as the approach does not 
assume arbitrary distributions but rather assumes that the efficiency of each company is 
constant over time (Eling & Luhnen, 2010). The approach requires a few years of data. (Eling 
& Luhnen, 2010) (Berger A. N., 1993) 
Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) 
The thick frontier approach assumes that high and low quartile firms experience 
inefficiencies differently (Eling & Luhnen, 2010). Size categories are selected, and firms are 
separated according to size (Caudill, 2002).   
 Non-parametric Techniques  
Non-parametric techniques consist of data envelopment analysis (DEA) and the free disposal 
hull approach (FDH). Data envelopment analysis (DEA), which measures the relationship 
between a firm’s outputs against its inputs, is the most commonly used mathematical 
programming approach. The DEA model was developed through the works of Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978, 1981) and Farrell (1957), in trying to measure efficiency using a 
combination of multiple inputs and outputs applicable to a variety of firms. (Charnes, Cooper, 
& Rhodes, 1978) (Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1981) (Farrell, 1957) (Seiford & Thrall, 
1990) 
Unlike the parametric techniques discussed above, the DEA technique makes no assumptions 
regarding the distribution of the inefficiency terms, but rather measures the efficiency of a 
firm relative to the efficiency frontier. The popularity of the technique is also due to its ability 
to expose relationships that would otherwise not be exposed when using other techniques. 
The DEA technique consists of two assumptions under which efficiency scores are estimated, 
variable returns to scale (VRS) and constant returns to scale (CRS). Constant returns to scale 
assumes that a change in input levels will lead to a proportionate change in output levels 
whereas variable returns to scale assumes that a change in input levels will lead to a greater 
than proportionate change in output levels (increasing returns to scale) or a less than 
proportionate change in output levels (decreasing returns to scale). While allowing for 
increasing and decreasing returns to scale, VRS also allows for the possibility of constant 
returns. When constant returns to scale are not possible, it is assumed that variable returns to 
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scale apply. An assumption of variable returns to scale is usually appropriate when dealing 
with multiple inputs, as a change in one input is unlikely to have a proportionate effect on 
output levels. Variable returns to scale are also appropriate when dealing with arbitrary input 
and output levels. (Thanassoulis, 2001) (Golany & Yu, 1997) (Banker & Thrall, 1992) 
The free disposal hull approach (FDH) requires fewer assumptions than other techniques. The 
technique consists of two steps; the first step creates or estimates the free disposal hull 
boundary or frontier, with the second step determining efficiency relative to the FDH 
boundary by calculating the distance of output and input points from the frontier. A weakness 
of FDH is its sensitivity to observations in the data set, with an increase in sample size 
increasing the possibility of certain observations dominating and skewing the results. The 
frontier of the free disposal hull approach may also be unduly influenced by outliers, 
necessitating the need for the elimination of outliers. (Daraio & Simar, 2007) (De Borger, 
Kerstens, Moesen, & Vanneste, 1994) 
2.5.2 Input and Output Variables for Insurance Services 
Insurance companies have three main inputs: labour; business services and material; and, 
capital, all of which are used to produce the three main activities performed by insurers, i.e. 
risk-pooling and risk-bearing; financial services; and financial intermediation (Eling & 
Luhnen, 2010). The choice of inputs and the relevant proxies is usually made by applicability 
and availability of information. (Cummins, Tennyson, & Weiss, 1999) (Jeng, Peng, & Wang, 
2007) 
Inputs 
Labour consists of agent and non-agent labour while capital can be split into equity and debt 
financing. Labour inputs can be calculated using employee costs or, when the data is 
available, number of employees and hours worked. Business services can be proxied by 
expenditure on items like advertising and communication. All three main inputs can be 
utilised; labour and capital are often used as inputs for insurance efficiency studies, as these 
are often viewed as the more important inputs. (Eling & Luhnen, 2010) (Cummins, 
Tennyson, & Weiss, 1999) (Jeng, Peng, & Wang, 2007) 
In analysing the efficiency of Indian life insurance firms, Chakraborty (2016) analysed 20 
efficiency studies on the insurance industry published during the 2005–2015 period. She 
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noted that most of the studies made use of operating expenses as input variables. Some of the 
studies narrowed down the operating expenses and utilised only labour expenses or 
employee-related costs. Chang and Chen (2010) noted that due to the different accounting 
systems used by insurers, it may often be difficult to identify and separate all labour related 
and business-service expenses. It is therefore more reasonable to utilise total expenses. Chang 
and Chen (2010) also noted that, in addition to expenses, equity and debt capital were also 
utilised by some studies. 
Outputs 
Risk-pooling and risk-bearing activities are usually represented by benefits paid, as they 
would approximate the funds pooled by all policy-holders and subsequently paid out to those 
policy-holders who have incurred losses to warrant the benefit payments. For the long-term 
insurance market, how the insurers invest assets is of great importance, particularly for 
policies such as life insurance and annuities. As insurers invest the funds received from 
policyholders, invested assets — or the increase or return on invested assets — are 
appropriate proxies for the financial intermediation function (Eling & Luhnen, 2010). 
Additionally, premiums earned, or the number of policies, may be used as an output, as the 
premiums received are necessary to produce the three main activities of insurers. Most 
studies use a mix of these outputs, such as benefits paid and return on invested assets. (Eling 
& Luhnen, 2010) (Cummins, Tennyson, & Weiss, 1999) (Jeng, Peng, & Wang, 2007) 
(Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015) (Chang & Chen, 2010) 
2.6 Empirical Literature 
The empirical examination of efficiency of insurance markets has received considerable 
attention over the past two decades. Evidence from three major reviews show a growth in the 
insurance efficiency literature from eight studies surveyed by Berger and Humphrey (1997); 
21 studies by Cummins and Weiss (2000) and 95 studies by Eling and Luhnen (2010). The 
most recent survey by Eling and Luhnen (2010) reveals that 58% of the studies used DEA, 
23% SFA, 7% DFA and 1% FDH, with the remaining 11% utilising a combination of 
approaches. In addition, evidence from the empirical literature also highlights skewed focus 
on insurance markets in U.S.A, Europe, Asia and Australia; with very few studies focused on 
insurance markets in Africa. The studies have broadly explored the effects of organisational 
form, distribution systems, market structure, mergers, equity, financial risk and regulatory 
changes on various forms of efficiency. For instance, Blomqvist and Johansson (1997) 
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examined the relationship between efficiency and public/private insurance, with the aim of 
determining whether there are efficiency gains to be made by public-private partnerships 
(PPP) in the insurance sector. In comparing a purely private insurance system to a PPP 
system, Blomqvist and Johansson (1997) found that a purely private insurance system will 
typically be more efficient than a PPP system, suggesting that PPP systems should only be 
embarked on for reasons other than efficiency. In Asia, Fukuyama (1997) looked at the 
productive efficiency and productivity changes of Japanese life insurance companies; while 
Chou and Hao (2005) utilised the distribution-free approach to estimate inefficiency and its 
causes in 26 Taiwanese life insurers, finding that efficiency was a result of economies of 
scale, market share and product diversification. Rai (1996) examined the cost efficiencies of 
insurance firms in 11 European countries between 1988 and 1992, using the stochastic cost 
frontier model and the distribution-free model.  (Rai, 1996) (Fukuyama, 1997) (Chou & Hao, 
2005) (Eling & Luhnen, 2010) 
Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1999) investigated the relationship between mergers and 
acquisitions and efficiency of US life insurers. Cummins et al. (1999) found a positive 
relationship between mergers and acquisitions and efficiency, with merged or acquired firms 
being more efficient than firms that have not had any mergers and acquisitions. Due to 
increasing competition and more stringent solvency requirements, insurers are forced to find 
new ways of decreasing costs, with many believing that economies of scale would greatly 
contribute to cost reduction. Thus, the findings of the study encourage mergers and 
acquisitions for insurers so that they can benefit from economies of scale and efficiency 
gains. Choi and Weiss (2005) examined the relationship between market structure and 
performance of property-liability insurers over the 1992–1998 period. Choi and Weiss (2005) 
found that cost-efficient firms have lower prices but higher profits, while revenue-efficient 
firms charge higher prices with higher profits. The results indicate that less focus should be 
placed on market structure, and more on efficiency – both cost and revenue efficiency – as 
that leads to higher profits. (Cummins, Tennyson, & Weiss, 1999). 
Prompted by the increasing importance of corporate governance due to corporate failures 
resulting from weak governance systems and the lack of available research on the topic, 
Diacon and O’Sullivan (1995) examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of UK insurance companies. The study focused on better understanding 
corporate governance instruments and their inter-relationships and then determining the effect 
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these governance instruments have on performance. The study included both short-term and 
long-term insurers, looking at corporate governance instruments, such as ownership structure, 
board composition, board subcommittees and CEO characteristics. Diacon and O’Sullivan 
(1995) were interested only in the effect of independent governance instruments after 
accounting for correlation; the corporate governance indicators could be grouped into the 
following categories: formal governance; chairman influence; CEO appointment; CEO 
influence and tenure; and, non-executive director influence. The study found a positive 
relationship between formal governance structures (such as subcommittees) and performance 
for short-term insurers, while excessive formal governance structures may unnecessarily 
preoccupy management and firm resources, resulting in management becoming more risk 
averse, which may negatively impact performance. Non-independent non-executive directors 
were found to have a positive impact on performance and long CEO tenures were found to 
have a negative impact on performance over time. Diacon and O’Sullivan (1995) also found 
the positive relationship between corporate governance and performance to be weaker in 
larger firms. Notably, the study found that corporate governance instruments have different 
effects on the performance of long-term insurers as compared to short-term insurers. (Diacon 
& O'Sullivan, 1995) 
Hsu and Petchsakulwong (2010) investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
and efficiency in the Thai non-life insurance industry. The study used individual corporate 
governance indicators as a measure of corporate governance, namely board size; board 
independence; board diligence; audit committee size and diligence; and financial expertise. 
Efficiency was measured using DEA methodology and based on 18 public non-life Thai 
insurers. To improve statistical efficiency, the study employed truncated, bootstrapped 
regression models to determine the relationship between efficiency and the corporate 
governance variables. The results showed that corporate governance does affect the 
efficiency of non-life insurers. Board independence and diligence was found to be positively 
correlated with firm efficiency, while audit-committee size was found to be negatively 
correlated with firm efficiency. (Hsu & Petchsakulwong, 2010) 
Kader, Adams & Hardwick (2010) investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and the cost efficiency of Takaful Insurance companies, utilising DEA measures 
to determine efficiency and specific and common corporate governance variables as a 
measure of corporate governance. Kader, Adams & Hardwick (2010) found the number of 
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independent directors to be insignificant, which supports stewardship theory, as the 
executives who have a better knowledge of the business provide more value and are naturally 
incentivised to act in the interests of shareholders and the firm. (Kader, Adams & Hardwick, 
2010) (Arjomandi, Ruhul, & Seufert, 2016) 
Board size was found to have a positive relationship with bank efficiency, indicating that a 
larger board provides more value to a firm. The financial services industry tends to be highly 
specialised, even more so in the insurance industry, and it would be reasonable to expect that, 
because of the specialised nature of the banking and insurance industries, an effective board 
would be one filled with all the necessary skills and experience required, which is potentially 
difficult and self-limiting in a small-sized board. (Kader, Adams & Hardwick, 2010) 
(Arjomandi, Ruhul, & Seufert, 2016) 
Jeng, Peng and Wang (2007), contrary to other Asian studies on efficiency and corporate 
governance, found that corporate governance does not play an important role in influencing 
the efficiency of life insurance firms in Taiwan. In line with insurance literature, the DEA 
approach was used as a measure of firm efficiency.  
Huang et al. (2011) found that corporate governance has a positive effect on firm efficiency, 
as most significant corporate governance variables have a positive effect on firm efficiency. 
Importantly, Huang et al. (2011) found that although on an overall level, corporate 
governance has a positive effect as expected, it also has some unexpected effects, and which 
may warrant further investigation beyond the scope of this study. This may tie in with an 
important question raised by Sibindi (2015) on the effect of over-regulation in the insurance 
industry, which may end up having unintended and undesirable effects.  
Most of studies on corporate governance and efficiency look at the effect of individual 
corporate governance variables on firm efficiency. The corporate governance variables in 
these studies are selected using past literature combined with the effect of agency costs and 
moral hazard. Jeng, Peng and Wang (2007) found a significant relationship between 
corporate governance variables and the efficiency of Taiwanese insurance firms, using data 
envelopment analysis. For non-life insurers, insider ownership, cash-flow rights and 
independent non-executive directors had a positive effect on efficiency while board size and 
CEO duality had negative effects on efficiency. Notably, Jeng et al. (2007) did not find a 
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significant relationship between corporate governance variables and the efficiency of life 
insurers (Jeng, Peng, & Wang, 2007). 
While it can be noted that these individual variables influence firm efficiency, it is also useful 
to determine the effect of all corporate governance variables, working together, on firm 
efficiency. Firms use several corporate governance variables to protect shareholder rights; 
some of which may improve firm efficiency, and while some may be detrimental to firm 
efficiency, yet others may have no effect.  
Since the recent review by Eling and Luhnen (2010), a considerable number of studies have 
examined efficiency of insurance markets in Africa. For instance, Barros and Wanke (2014) 
assessed the efficiency of life and non-life insurers in Mozambique over the 2002–2011 
period, using a two-stage DEA approach. Barros and Wanke (2014) found that efficiency of 
Mozambican insurers was driven mainly by ownership rather than market share, as private 
firms tended to have higher efficiency levels than public firms. Furthermore, the study noted 
an increase in efficiency levels with firms of Portuguese origin; foreign firms (firms of South 
African origin) had lower efficiency levels, indicating that cultural aspects play a role in 
efficiency in the Mozambican market. Barros and Wanke (2014) suggest that firms with 
lower efficiency levels should follow the same procedures of their more efficient 
counterparts, to improve efficiency. (Barros & Wanke, 2014) 
Barros, Dumbo and Wanke (2014) analysed the efficiency of seven Angolan insurance 
companies over the 2003–2012 period. Insurance penetration in Africa (excluding South 
Africa) is low; Angola has a small insurance market consisting of only eight insurance 
companies. The approach used is like that of Barros and Wanke (2014), using data 
envelopment analysis and neural networks, with operating costs, number of employees and 
capital as input variables and premiums earned and ceded reinsurance as output variables. 
The study also found that cultural aspects play a role in efficiency in the Angolan market, as 
efficiency levels tended to increase with firms of Portuguese origin. This is in line with the 
findings of Barros and Wanke (2014) in Mozambique, suggesting that cultural aspects play a 
strong role in African countries with Portuguese influences. Additionally, Barros et al. (2014) 
noted a capacity shortfall in the Angolan industry; the industry would benefit from mergers 
and acquisitions due to the small size of the insurers. Merging or acquiring firms with best-
practice procedures and higher efficiency levels would be expected to improve the efficiency 
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and capacity constraints of the merged firm. (Barros & Wanke, 2014) (Barros, Dumbo, & 
Wanke, 2014) 
In West Africa, Barros, Caporale and Ibiwoye (2008) performed an efficiency analysis of the 
insurance industry in Nigeria and found that Nigerian firms experienced declining efficiency 
over the 1997–2003 period, due to inadequate management, scale and technology. Unlike 
Barros et al. (2014), size was found to have a negative effect on efficiency, owing to 
diseconomies of scale. In Ghana, Ansah-Adu et al. (2012) examined the efficiency and 
efficiency determinants of Ghanaian insurers. Using data envelopment analysis, inputs were 
measured by total capital, operating costs and investments, with output variables of profit or 
loss, net premium and investment income. The study found life insurers to be more efficient 
than non-life insurers, possibly due to the increased competition in the life insurance market. 
Unlike the findings of Barros and Wanke (2014), market share was found to be a key 
determinant of efficiency and firms with higher efficiency were characterised by less equity 
or more debt, suggesting that inefficient firms have much to gain from increased leverage. 
While Barros et al. (2014) found a negative relationship between size and efficiency, Ansah-
Adul et al. (2012) found a significant positive relationship between size and efficiency, owing 
to economies of scale. Furthermore, although Barros and Wanke (2014) found a significant 
positive relationship between ownership and efficiency, Ansah-Adul et al. (2012) found 
ownership to have an insignificant effect on efficiency. (Ansah-Adu et al., 2011) (Barros & 
Wanke, 2014) (Barros et al., 2014) 
In South Africa, Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) examined efficiency, productivity and 
returns-to-scale economies in the non-life insurance industry in South Africa. Using input 
variables of labour, business services and capital, and output variables of net premium 
earned, claims incurred and investment income, Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) employed the 
data envelopment analysis technique and Simar and Wilson’s (2007) bootstrapping 
procedure. Contrary to the findings of Barros et al. (2014) and Ansah-Adul et al. (2012), 
Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) found a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between size and 
efficiency. The study also found a positive relationship between product line diversification 
and efficiency, and a negative relationship between reinsurance activities and efficiency. 
Unlike Barros et al., (2008), Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) found a negative relationship 
between leverage and efficiency, a notable finding, as increased leverage is expected to 
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improve returns, profitability and efficiency; Barros et al. (2008) found a positive relationship 
between leverage and efficiency. Alhassan and Biekpe (2016) conducted another study on the 
non-life insurance industry in South Africa, examining the effect of competition on 
efficiency. The study found a positive relationship between competition and efficiency, 
suggesting that when there are more firms in the market, the more efficient firms can compete 
effectively. (Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016). 
2.7 Summary  
As can be observed from the efficiency studies on insurance markets in Africa, it appears 
there is a gap in the efficiency literature with regards to corporate governance and efficiency 
relationship in insurance markets in Africa. The mostly widely-explored effect of corporate 
governance mechanism has been in relation to financial performance indicators. For example, 
Ntim (2013) investigates the relationship between corporate governance and performance in 
listed firms on the JSE in South Africa. The author generated a corporate governance index 
based on the King III Code on Corporate Governance and found a significant positive 
relationship between corporate governance provisions and financial performance. Unlike the 
insurance market, the sample employed by Ntim (2013) is required to comply with the King 
Code (JSE Limited, 2012). Hence, this study focuses on the long-term insurance market, a 
comprehensive corporate governance index based on King III would not be appropriate if the 
insurance sector does not make use of the King provisions. However, the inclusion of the 
King III Code on governance for this study is substantiated by the legal requirement of South 
African companies to comply with the Companies Act of 2008, whose fundamentals are 
similar to those of King III (The Companies Act, 2008). Additionally, research undertaken by 
Sibindi (2015) concludes that a significant majority of the South African insurance sector 





Table 2.5: Taxonomy of Efficiency Studies in the Insurance Market 




Method Inputs Output Efficiencies estimated Application category 




DEA Total capital, 
total operating 
cost and total 
investments 




Cost Evaluation of efficiency and 
efficiency determinants 




DEA Labour and 
capital 
Gross premiums Cost, technical, pure 



















technical and scale 
Efficiency determinants and 
returns to scale 
Alhassan and 
Biekpe (2016) 
South Africa 75-80 2007-
2012 







Cost and profit Competition 













Technical and scale Evaluation of efficiency 
Barros et al. (2008) Nigeria 25 1994-
2005 













Technical and scale Evaluation of efficiency and 
efficiency determinants 
Barros et al. (2014) Angola 7 2003-
2012 













Bikker, J.A and 
Van Leuvensteijn 
(2008) 




SFA Acquisition costs 







capital and total 
insured annuities  
 Cost Evaluation of efficiency and   
competition 









benefits paid and 
income from 
investments 
Technical and scale Evaluation of efficiency  










Premium income Technical and scale Evaluation and evolution of 
efficiency 
Choi and Weiss 
(2005) 






and total invested 
assets 
Cost and revenue Market structure 















Scale Evaluation of efficiency 
 Cummins and Zi 
(1998) 










Technical, cost and 
allocation 
 Methodology 




DEA Labour, business 
services, debt 
and equity 
Benefits paid Technical, allocation, 





Cummins et al. 
(1999) 
 United States  750  1988-
1995 






and additions to 
reserves 
Cost, technical, scale, 
allocation, revenue 
Evaluation of efficiency and 
mergers 
 Fukuyama (1997)  Japan   25  1988-
1993 
 DEA Labour and 
capital 
 Insurance 
reserves and loans 
Technical, scale and 
allocation 















cost and revenue 
Corporate governance 
 Huang et al. (2011) United States  28  2000-
2007 




and total invested 
assets 
Technical and cost  Corporate governance 
 Jeng et al. (2007) United    States  11  1979-
2001 




 Benefit payments Technical, cost and 
allocation 
Evaluation of efficiency and 
ownership/demutualization 
Luhnen (2009) Germany 295 1995-
2006 








Evaluation of efficiency and 
productivity 
 Rai (1996)  11 OECD 
countries 





and benefits and 
claims 
 Total premiums  Cost Evaluation of efficiency and 
country comparisons 




CHAPTER THREE:  
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology and procedures used for data collection and analysis 
of the long-term insurance market in South Africa. It presents the research design, strategy 
and empirical techniques applied, while also identifying the limitations of the research design 
and techniques used. Furthermore, the chapter includes a discussion of the various 
methodologies used in the insurance industry research literature and provides justification for 
the research design utilised for this study.  
3.2 Research Design  
The research undertaken is a quantitative explanatory study which aims to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance variables and firm performance. The results of the 
research are expected to identify the existence, significance and direction of the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance, as measured by efficiency. 
3.3 Data Sources 
The data to be used for this study consists of quantitative data. The data used for the study 
will be obtained from the annual reports of the selected insurers for the 2007 to 2014 period. 
The information contained in the annual reports is expected to be accurate, reliable and valid, 
as the annual reports are issued by the insurers themselves and audited by the relevant South 
African auditing firms. The use of information obtained directly from the annual reports of 
the selected firms is supported by Ntim (2013), who states that the use of analysts’ corporate 
governance ratings creates a subjective analysis as the corporate governance ratings will be 
based on the analyst’s opinion of the corporate governance quality. Thus, obtaining the 
corporate governance information directly from the annual reports of the selected firms will 
remove that bias.  
3.4 Sample  
There are currently 80 registered long-term insurers in South Africa (Financial Services 
Board, 2016). The sample for this study will consist of 73 registered long-term insurers, 
which is representative of the population, as the sample represents 91% of the long-term 
insurance market. It is of great importance that the sample is as representative as possible, for 
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the conclusions and findings of the study to be applied and useful to the long-term insurance 
industry as a whole.  
3.5 Estimation Efficiency Scores: Data Envelopment Analysis  
In line with efficiency studies by Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) in the short-term insurance 
market in Ghana, as well as Ansah-Adu et al. (2012) and Alhassan et al. (2015) on the 
insurance market in Ghana, this study employed the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
measure insurance firm efficiency. DEA is the most commonly used measure of efficiency 
and has the advantages of allowing for multiple inputs and outputs. All deviations from the 
efficient frontier arise only from efficiency. (Arjomandi, Ruhul, & Seufert, 2016) (Eling & 
Luhnen, 2010). 
- Inputs 
Following the arguments by Eling and Luhnen (2010) as adopted by Alhassan and Biekpe 
(2015), this study defines inputs for the life insurance market into labour and business 
services, debt capital and equity capital. The proxy for labour and business services is 
management expenditure and sales and administration cost, while debt and equity capital are 
measured as the total debt and total equity respectively. These proxies are mostly motivated 
by data availability and are consistent with the empirical literature. (Alhassan & Biekpe, 
2015) (Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016) (Jeng, Peng, & Wang, 2007) (Huang, Lai, McNamara, & 
Wang, 2011)  
-Outputs 
Efficiency output can be measured using incurred benefits and invested assets. An important 
role played by insurance companies is risk-pooling and financial intermediation. Incurred 
benefits, represented by payments received by policyholders, are often used as a proxy for 
risk-pooling in the life insurance market. Invested assets, representing investments made 
using premiums received from policyholders, are often used as a proxy for financial 
intermediation in the insurance industry. Thus, incurred benefits and invested assets are used 
as efficiency outputs. (Eling & Luhnen, 2010) (Cummins, Tennyson, & Weiss, 1999) (Jeng, 
Peng, & Wang, 2007) 
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3.6 Empirical Model 
In examining the relationship between corporate governance and efficiency in the Long-term 
insurance market in South Africa, this study adopts the empirical model of Alhassan and 
Biekpe (2015) and Luhnen (2009) as defined below; 
                                                                     
      
where   and   denote insurer and year respectively; EFF is the DEA estimate of efficiency; 
BSIZE, NED, ASIZE, CEOT and ADIND represents board size, non-executive directors, 
audit committee size, CEO tenure and audit committee independence respectively, and X 
represents a list of firm level and control variables made up of size, reinsurance and leverage. 
 3.6.1 Description of Variables 
Corporate Governance Variables 
Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) found a positive relationship between board 
independence and profitability in the insurance industry. With respect to board size, boards 
appear to be less effective as they grow; as decision-making becomes less efficient. Studies 
by Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgen and Wells (1998) support this theory, finding a 
negative relationship between board size and corporate value. Conversely, empirical evidence 
by Dalton, Ellstrand and Johnson (1999) and Dowen (1995) found board size to be positively 
related to profitability. This could be attributed to the fact that a larger board allows for a 
wider variety of skills and expertise, which would improve decision-making and thus the 
effectiveness of the board. The evidence on board composition and size appears contradictory 
and it would be important to determine their effect on the performance of firms in the long-
term insurance industry. The importance and relevance of these corporate governance 
mechanisms supports their inclusion as a corporate governance indicator for this study. 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983) (The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2009) (Connelly & 
Limpaphayom, 2004) (Dowen, 1995) 
The argument around audit committee size is similar to that involving board size, with larger 
audit committees allowing for greater skills and expertise while also resulting in inefficient 
decision-making due to the large number of players involved. Huang, Lai, McNamara and 
Wang’s (2011) study on efficiency expected a positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and financial expertise and firm efficiency in the US insurance industry. The 
 
36 
actual results of the study, utilising data envelopment analysis (DEA) efficiency measures, 
found a significantly negative relationship between audit committee financial expertise and 
efficiency. Huang, Lai, McNamara and Wang (2011) utilised the DEA approach for its 
advantage of allowing the use of multiple inputs and outputs. 
The corporate governance variables will be measured as follows:  
i. Board size (BSIZE): Board size will be measured by the number of directors on the 
board. 
ii. Board independence (NED): Board independence will be measured by the percentage 
of board members who are non-executive directors 
iii. Audit committee size (ASIZE): Audit committee size will be measured by the number 
of audit committee members. 
iv. CEO tenure (CEOT): CEO tenure will be measured by the number of years the CEO 
has served on the board. 
v. Audit independence (ADIND): Audit independence will be measured by the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee. 
3.6.2 Control Variables 
The control variables selected for use in this study are commonly used in the insurance 
literature.  
i. Firm Size 
Firm size may strongly influence the results of the study, as it would be expected that 
larger firms may have increased efficiency, consequently holding this constant will 
remove the benefits or disadvantages of firm size, as this is not the aim of the study 
(Luhnen, 2009). 
ii. Reinsurance 
Reinsurance is used as a risk management tool by insurers to reduce bankruptcy risk 
and as protection from catastrophes (Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016). Sing’ombe (2016) 
found a positive relationship between reinsurance and financial performance. Thus, 







Increased leverage has been proven to increase the efficiency of a firm, which may 
distort the results of the study (Luhnen, 2009). 
3.7 Estimation Technique 
The estimation technique used is the truncated bootstrapping regression technique, employed 
by Simar and Wilson (2007). The bootstrap procedure was introduced by Simar and Wilson 
(2007) to address the shortfalls of DEA when estimating efficiency scores. The truncated 
bootstrapping regression technique can be done using a single bootstrap procedure or a 
double bootstrap procedure. Simar and Wilson (2007) noted that the double bootstrap 
procedure improved statistical efficiency in second-stage regression.  
Simar and Wilson (2007) propose two bootstrap procedures, with the first procedure 
improving inference without accounting for the bias term, while the second procedure 
provides bias-corrected estimates. The second procedure, ‘Algorithm 2’, will be used in this 
study. (Simar & Wilson, 2007) 
The procedure involves the following steps: 
- DEA is used to estimate efficiency 
- In the truncated regression, an estimate of β is attained, using the method of 
maximum likelihood (Huang et al., 2011) the efficiency scores are regressed using 
truncated maximum likelihood estimation (Balcombe, Davidova, & Latruffe, 2007) 
- Obtain n sets of bootstrap estimates 
- These estimates are then integrated into a bootstrap procedure, which can correct for 
bias (Balcombe et al., 2007) 
- Another bootstrap procedure is performed, using the bias corrected scores from the 
previous bootstrap and confidence intervals are produced for the efficiency scores 




CHAPTER FOUR:  
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between corporate 
governance and efficiency of 73 long-term insurers over the period 2007 to 2014, with the 
analysis performed in two stages. The stage 1 results that summarise the efficiency statistics 
of the 73 firms will be presented first, followed by the truncated bootstrap regression results. 
4.2 First Stage Results 
4.2.1 Efficiency Analysis 
The summary statistics of the efficiency scores are presented in Table 4.1. The results of both 
the original and bias-corrected efficiency scores are presented in Table 4.1. The first stage 
results show a mean technical efficiency (BC-TE) score of 21.15%, pure technical efficiency 
(BC-PTE) score of 47.77% and a scale efficiency (BC-SE) score of 47.45%. This is 
significantly different from the findings of Huang et al. (2011) who found a mean technical 
efficiency score of 90% in the U.S. property liability insurance industry. Similar findings 
were made by Jeng et al. (2007), who found a mean technical efficiency score of 87% for 
Taiwanese life insurers and 94% for Taiwanese property liability insurers. Adams et al. 
(2010) found a TE score of 55%, PTE score of 74% and SE score of 71% for Takaful 
insurance companies. The efficiency scores are significantly lower than those of South 
African non-life insurers, which Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) found to be 52% for TE, 59% 
for PTE and 87% for SE, an indication that the long-term insurance industry is less efficient 
than the short-term insurance industry in South Africa.  The pure technical efficiency score 
and scale efficiency score are almost equal, indicating that the technical inefficiency is 
attributable to pure technical inefficiency and scale inefficiency. A firm is technically 
efficient if it obtains maximum output from the least amount of inputs. With an average 
technical efficiency score of 21.15%, South African long-term insurers are, on average, using 
substantially more inputs than necessary to obtain maximum output. This implies that these 
insurers are not using inputs efficiently and would benefit from a reduction in inputs such as 
labour and administration costs, debt and equity. A firm is operating at its optimal size if its 
scale efficiency score is 1; with a scale efficiency score of 47.45%, long-term insurance firms 
are not operating at optimal size and are either too small or too large. Undersized firms would 
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benefit from mergers and acquisitions to obtain economies of scale benefits, while oversized 
firms would benefit from downsizing to minimise decreasing economies of scale.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Efficiency Scores 
  TE BC-TE PTE BC-PTE SE BC-SE 
Mean  0.3230 0.2115 0.6148 0.4777 0.5415 0.4745 
Median 0.1551 0.1074 0.6265 0.5096 0.5227 0.4597 
Std. Dev 0.3287 0.2046 0.3548 0.2710 0.3572 0.3278 
Minimum 0.0229 0.0124 0.1031 0.0813 0.0744 0.0509 
Maximum 1.0000 0.5909 1.0000 0.8271 1.0000 0.9318 
N 483 481 483 483 483 481 
Note: PTE=Pure Technical Efficiency; TE=Technical Efficiency; SE=Scale Efficiency; BC= Bias Corrected; Source: 
Author’s estimate from research data 
The correlation between original and bias-corrected efficiency scores are presented in Table 
4.2, which shows that the bias-corrected scores are lower than the original scores. The 
original and bias-corrected scores are highly correlated, in the 96-97% range, leading to the 
conclusion that the scores are similar (Huang et al., 2011).  
Table 4.2: Correlation Between Original and Bias-corrected Efficiency Scores 
  Original N Bias-corrected N Correlation 
TE 0.3230 483 0.2115 481 0.9715*** 
PTE 0.6148 483 0.4777 483 0.9727*** 
SE 0.5415 483 0.4745 481 0.9628*** 
Note: PTE=Pure Technical Efficiency; TE=Technical Efficiency; SE=Scale Efficiency; BC= Bias Corrected; *** 
denotes significance at 1%; Source: Author’s estimate from research data 
Table 4.3 reports the evolution of efficiency scores of South African long-term insurers over 
the period 2007 to 2014. From 2007 to 2010, the South African long-term insurance industry 
experienced a significant decline in technical efficiency. In four of the years under analysis, 
technical efficiency remained below 20% and below the average score for the entire 2007 to 
2014 period. The average technical efficiency score during the period under review appears 
slightly inconsistent, however, apart from the jump in 2011; the scores seem to show a 
downward trend of decreasing technical efficiency until 2014. Overall, the pure technical 
efficiency scores show an upward trend, peaking at 61% in 2014. The scale efficiency scores 
experienced a downward trend, from 85% in 2007 to 49% in 2014. In the latter years (2012 to 
2014), the pure technical efficiency scores are higher than the scale efficiency scores, 
suggesting that during this period the technical efficiency was mainly due to scale 
inefficiencies. Therefore, it would be expected that an increase in scale efficiency would have 







Table 4. 3: Evolution of Efficiency Scores (2007 -2014) 
Periods TE BC-TE CI-UB CI-LB   PTE BC-PTE CI-UB CI-LB   SE BC-SE CI-UB CI-LB  N 
2007 0.4818 0.3262 0.4933 0.2986   0.5365 0.3739 0.5092 0.3092   0.9027 0.8545 0.9604 0.9556  56 
2008 0.3731 0.2253 0.5030 0.3110   0.5266 0.3756 0.5064 0.3171   0.7105 0.6174 0.9845 0.9779  64 
2009 0.2343 0.1470 0.2781 0.1678   0.6126 0.4744 0.5924 0.3935   0.4121 0.3512 0.4849 0.4604  69 
2010 0.2176 0.1346 0.2387 0.1505   0.5977 0.4564 0.5753 0.3772   0.3554 0.2974 0.3622 0.3537  67 
2011 0.3730 0.2484 0.3902 0.2305   0.6559 0.4981 0.6381 0.4026   0.5895 0.5226 0.6105 0.5761  38 
2012 0.3012 0.1969 0.3308 0.2019   0.6569 0.5283 0.6395 0.4400   0.4757 0.4078 0.5188 0.4819  67 
2013 0.2614 0.1631 0.2827 0.1748   0.6364 0.5066 0.6199 0.4223   0.4050 0.3376 0.4231 0.4044  61 
2014 0.3949 0.2925 0.4172 0.2592   0.7067 0.6101 0.6984 0.5090   0.5619 0.4988 0.6021 0.5217  61 
Average 0.3230 0.2115 0.3611 0.2213   0.6148 0.4777 0.5960 0.3967   0.5415 0.4745 0.6093 0.5828  483 
Note: TE=Technical Efficiency; PTE=Pure Technical Efficiency; SE=Scale Efficiency; BC= Bias Corrected; CI-UB=Upper Bound Confidence; CI-LB=Lower Bound Confidence; 
N=Observations;  





4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.4 reports the summary statistics of the corporate governance and control variables. 
The King Codes propose that non-executive directors should make up most of the board and 
audit committees should comprise only non-executive directors. The results show that on 
average, non-executive directors comprise 60% of the board of directors and 73% of audit 
committees, which shows that on average, long-term insurers in South Africa comply with 
the King Codes, Companies Act of 2008 and general good governance principles. This is in 
line with the findings of Sibindi (2015), who found that within the South African insurance 
sector, a significant majority complies with the King III Code. The King Codes recommend a 
board of directors comprised mainly of non-executive directors due to their independence and 
impartiality, as they are not involved in the day-to-day running of the business. Non-
executive directors compose 60% of company boards included in our analysis, which is 
consistent with the provisions of the King Codes and good governance principles. The King 
Codes and the Companies Act of 2008 place great importance on the establishment of 
effective and independent audit committees, recommending that audit committees comprise a 
minimum of three members who are all independent, non-executive directors. On average, 
the insurers in our analysis have audit committees consisting of four members, of which 73% 
are independent. Although the four members exceed the minimum, the proportion of 
independent audit committee members is notably below the 100% recommended by the King 
Codes, which may be expected to have an impact on the effectiveness of the committee. 
Andrews, Kanun and Luo (2014) investigated the importance and effect of CEO tenure and 
found that the optimal CEO tenure amounted to 4.8 years; the average CEO tenure for 
insurers in our analysis amounted to five years. (The Companies Act, 2008) (The Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, 2009). 
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Corporate Governance and Control Variables 
  Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max N 
Board size 8 7 4 1 32 446 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 60 63 22 0 100 446 
Audit Committee size 4 4 2 0 12 431 
CEO Tenure 5 4 4 0 18 290 
Audit Independence (%) 73 75 29 0.00 100 289 
Size 13.979 14.038 2.980 1.099 20.189 477 
Reins 0.37 0.182 0.404 0.000 1.000 384 
NPE 3.200 1.052 4.640 0.000 14.907 469 
Notes: Size=firm size; Reins=Reinsurance usage; NPE=Leverage. Source: Author’s estimate from research data 
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4.2.3 Correlation Results 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.5, no multicollinearity was observed among the 
independent or control variables, with all correlation coefficients well below 0.7, the 
multicollinearity threshold (Kennedy, 2008). The independent variables show very low 
correlation scores, with the highest correlation score being -0.319, significant at 1%, which 
shows a negative correlation between audit independence and audit size, indicating that a 
more independent audit committee would be smaller in size. Board size and firm size were 
positively correlated at 1% significance level, with a correlation score of 0.422, an indication 
that the larger the firm the larger the board size. 
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.BSIZE 1.000 
       2.NED 0.142*** 1.000 
      3.ASIZE  0.132*** -0.133*** 1.000 
     4.CEOT 0.064 -0.019 0.096 1.000 
    5.ADIND 0.015 0.219*** -0.319*** -0.069 1.000 
   6.SIZE 0.422*** -0.029 0.073 0.108* -0.012 1.000 
  7.REINS 0.060 0.014 0.036 -0.014 0.007 0.018 1.000 
 8.NPE -0.110** -0.135*** -0.091* 0.037 -0.144** 0.179*** -0.005 1.000 
Notes: BSIZE= Board size; NED= Non-executive directors; ASIZE= Audit committee size; CEOT=CEO 
Tenure;ADIND=Audit Independence; Size=firm size; Reins=Reinsurance usage; NPE=Leverage ***, ** and * denotes 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Author’s estimate from research data 
 
4.3 Second Stage Results: Corporate Governance and Efficiency  
The second stage of the analysis the effect of corporate governance on estimate efficiency 
scores is presented in Table 4.6. The regression equation is first estimated using the Simar 
and Wilson (2007) bootstrapping technique discussed in the previous chapter. The Tobit 
estimation technique is also used as form of a robustness test. Overall, two (2) Models are 
estimated under each technique. The estimations under Model 1 only employ the corporate 
governance variables as the independent variables while Model 2 includes the three control 
variables in size, reinsurance and leverage, resulting in four regression outputs. The 
diagnostics from all the regression results indicate the statistical fitness of the models in 
explaining the variations in technical efficiency across long-term insurers in South Africa. 
Board size (BSIZE) was found to have a negative relationship with efficiency which indicates 
that long-term insurers with large board size have lower levels of technical efficiency. This 
result supports the establishment of smaller boards for increased efficiency. As discussed 
earlier, evidence on the effect of board size appeared contradictory. The results of this 
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analysis are consistent with those of Jeng, Peng, and Wang (2007) and Yermack (1996), who 
found a negative relationship between board size and corporate value. This seems to suggest 
that although a larger board allows for a wider variety of skills and expertise, a smaller board 
may be more effective, possibly due to quicker decision-making and a more cohesive team. 
However, board size is not a key driver of efficiency as it was not found to be significant.  
The proportion of non-executive directors (NED) sitting on the board of directors has a 
negative relationship with efficiency, which is contrary to expectations, as a high number of 
non-executive directors would be expected to increase the effectiveness of the board. Since 
non-executive directors are not engaged in the day-to-day management of the business, the 
assumption is that they would be less likely to be easily influenced by management and 
would be able to robustly assess and question management and board decisions. The 
relationship is significant at 1%. These findings are consistent with those of Huang at al. 
(2011), who found that executive directors have a positive relationship with efficiency.  
CEO tenure has a positive relationship with efficiency, which is significant at 5%. The longer 
the tenure of the CEO, the higher the efficiency of the firm, which is an indication that firms 
benefit from CEOs with experience. During the early years of a CEO’s tenure, the CEO 
acquires more knowledge and expertise, which can be put to good use in later years. This is 
contrary to expectations as one would expect that extended tenure may result in complacency, 
dominance over the board and a lack of objectivity. However, our results appear to support 
the findings by Huang at al. (2011) that the expertise and firm-specific experience provided 
by the extended tenure overrides the negative aspects. 
Consistent with Hsu and Petchsakulwong (2010), audit committee size has a negative 
relationship with technical efficiency, however this relationship was not found to be 
significant. This is similar to board size, although a larger committee size may bring a variety 
of opinions and expertise, leading to more effective monitoring, the variety of opinions may 
result in slower decision-making which may affect the efficiency of the committee. Our 
results show that a smaller committee is beneficial, as larger committees would reduce 
technical efficiency. 
Audit independence has a positive relationship with efficiency, which was found to be 
significant at 5%. This is in line with expectations, as an audit committee oversees the 
external and internal audits of the business, financial statements, the finance function, risk 
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management, sustainability and integrated reporting, which are fundamental to the 
performance and sustainability of a business. An independent audit committee would be able 
to appropriately perform its duties without interference from management. These findings are 
in line with those of Chan and Li (2008), Klein (1998) and Huang et al. (2011). 
To provide some robustness to results of the truncated bootstrapping technique, the study 
employs the Tobit regression technique which treats dependent variables as censored. The 
results from the Tobit estimates also presented similar results using the Simar-Wilson 
bootstrapping approach, except for audit size. Using Tobit regression, audit size was found to 
have a positive relationship with technical efficiency, significant at 10%. The results of our 
analysis provide enough evidence to reject our null hypothesis that there is no relationship 





Table 4.6: Regression Results 
 Dependent variable: Technical Efficiency 
 Simar-Wilson Bootstrapping   Tobit 
Models Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
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Notes: BSIZE= Board size; NED= Non-executive directors; ASIZE= Audit committee size; CEOT=CEO Tenure; 
ADIND=Audit Independence; Size=firm size; Reins=Reinsurance usage; NPE=Leverage; Bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses for the Simar-Wilson truncated regression ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: 






CHAPTER FIVE:  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the relationship between efficiency and corporate governance in the 
long-term insurance industry in South Africa, using 73 long-term insurers which represent 
91% of the market, over the 2007-2014 period. This chapter presents a summary of the study 
and conclusions, followed by policy recommendations based on the findings of the study and 
recommendations for future study based on the limitations of the study.  
5.2 Summary of the Study  
Simar and Wilson’s (2007) truncated double bootstrapping approach was used to determine 
the relationship between efficiency and specific corporate governance variables in a 
two-stage analysis. In the first stage, firm efficiency is estimated using the data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) bootstrapping technique of Simar and Wilson (2007), which corrects for 
biases associated with non-parametric techniques. In the second stage analysis, the truncated 
bootstrapping regression technique is employed to examine the effect of corporate 
governance on the estimated efficiency scores.  The corporate governance variables used 
were board size, board independence, audit committee size, CEO tenure and audit 
independence, while controlling for firm size, reinsurance usage and leverage. In the first 
stage, the average technical efficiency score amounted to 21%, indicating that the long-term 
insurers under analysis were operating at 21% efficiency, which is significantly lower than 
the average technical efficiency scores found by Adams et al. (2010), Alhassan and Biekpe 
(2015), Huang et al. (2011) and Jeng et al. (2007), which range from 52% to 94%. The 
second stage regression results show a significant relationship between technical efficiency 
and the corporate governance variables of non-executive directorship, CEO tenure and audit 
independence. CEO tenure and audit independence have a positive relationship with 
efficiency, while non-executive directorship has a negative relationship with efficiency which 
is contrary to expectations. Although not significant, audit committee size and board size 
were found to have a negative relationship with efficiency. The control variables of firm size, 
reinsurance usage and leverage were found to be significantly related to efficiency.  
5.3 Conclusions  
The findings indicate that long-term insurers in South Africa operated at high levels of 
inefficiency in the provision of insurance services during the period under review. Board size 
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and audit committee size were found to have a negative relationship with efficiency, although 
the relationship was not significant. This indicates that insurers do not benefit from larger 
boards and committees. It would be expected that larger boards and committees would allow 
for a greater variety of skills and expertise, but it may be possible that, due to the specialised 
nature of insurance, only a few directors with specialised expertise in the industry are needed. 
The results show that audit committee independence and CEO tenure have significant 
positive relationships with technical efficiency. Audit committee independence is a key 
aspect of corporate governance principles and the King Codes; thus, this relationship is 
expected since the average insurer in our analysis has an audit committee that is 73% 
independent. Notably, the number of non-executive directors on the board of directors is 
found to have a significant and negative relationship with technical efficiency. As 
non-executive directors are not engaged in the day-to-day management of the business and 
are usually completely independent of the business, this seems to confirm that long-term 
insurers benefit from directors with detailed knowledge of the business or industry, as 
non-executive directors may not have the same knowledge and expertise as they are not 
involved in the day-to-day management of the business. However, the negative relationship 
between non-executive directors and efficiency may not be an indication that non-executive 
directors do not add value. Non-executive directors compose a large proportion of audit 
committees, which has a positive effect on efficiency; thus the negative effect of non-
executive directors may indicate a problem in the way that non-executive directors are used. 
Non-executive directors may be inadvertently limited in their ability to effectively contribute 
if they are not well-represented in important decision-making committees, such as the 
nomination and risk committees. Additionally, the King Codes require boards to meet a 
minimum of 4 times a year in order to be effective, thus non-executive directors on boards 
that meet less than four times a year may not have the opportunity to provide value. This 
represents a limitation to the findings, as more information is required in order to conclude 
that non-executive directors do not add value. (The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 
2009) 
5.4 Policy Recommendations 
The findings of the study can be applied to the South African long-term insurance industry, as 
91% of the industry was included in the study. Non-executive directors are necessary as part 
of industry regulations and ‘good corporate governance’, consequently for non-executive 
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directors to have a more positive impact on efficiency, insurers need to institute more rigid 
nomination and application processes and requirements to ensure that the non-executives are 
appropriately skilled and qualified. Additionally, more extensive orientation practices for new 
non-executive directors may be needed, followed by regular meetings of non-executive 
directors for them to remain up to date and as knowledgeable as executive directors. Adams 
et al. (2010) suggest that these results indicate that the role of non-executive directors needs 
to be clarified, and that non-executive directors without adequate financial expertise take a 
backseat and allow the board to be run by executive directors and the CEO, thus negating 
their purpose. Additionally, these findings may suggest that insurers should look at ex-
management or ex-directors of other insurers to sit on their boards as non-executive directors. 
As noted earlier, the negative relationship between non-executive directors and efficiency 
may possibly be due to the under-representation of non-executive directors on sub-
committees. The King Codes require all sub-committees, excluding the risk committee, to be 
comprised of a majority of non-executive directors.  The findings also suggest that although 
long-serving CEOs have the potential to dominate the board, CEOs should be allowed to 
serve for longer terms to provide benefit, thus frequent rotation of CEOs is not advisable. 
(Kader, Adams & Hardwick, 2010) 
On average, the audit committees of insurers are 73% independent. Due to the positive effect 
of audit committee independence on efficiency, insurers should work towards having audit 
committees that are 100% independent, which is in full compliance with the King Codes. 
Notably, most of the corporate governance indicators have a negative effect on efficiency, 
which is not the intended effect. Thus, this is an indication that corporate governance 
measures should not be enforced on insurers as a ‘one size fits all’ measure, but rather a focus 
should be placed on measures that have the intended impact, such as audit committee 
independence. Insurers may benefit from targeting specific measures to fully comply with to 
achieve the maximum benefit, rather than attempts to partly comply with as many governance 
mechanisms as possible. 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Studies 
Due to the exceedingly low efficiency levels of the long-term South African insurance 
industry, it would be of great use to investigate the determinants of efficiency in the industry. 
Other efficiency studies such as Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) have been carried out on the 
short-term insurance industry in South Africa, however no such study has been performed 
 
49 
over the long-term insurance industry in South Africa. Additionally, the findings show that 
long-term insurers operate with scale inefficiencies. The study did not, however, delve into 
the causes of these scale inefficiencies, whether they arose from decreasing returns to scale or 
increasing returns to scale. This would better inform the insurance industry as to whether 
scale inefficiencies arise from firms being undersized or oversized. Furthermore, it would be 
of use to look at the relationship between corporate governance and cost efficiency. As 
discussed earlier, the South African insurance industry has undergone significant reform in 
recent years and it would be of interest to determine the effects of the reforms on the 
efficiency of long-term insurers.  
As noted previously, there are limited studies on efficiency and corporate governance in the 
African insurance market. This study looked at the effect of five notable corporate 
governance variables on efficiency, and now that it has been determined that corporate 
governance does affect efficiency, other studies could investigate the relationship between 
efficiency and other notable corporate governance variables such as CEO duality, number of 
actuaries on the board of directors, board diligence and financial expertise on the audit 
committee. Additionally, some assumptions have been made relating to the causes of the 
negative relationship between non-executive directorship and efficiency.  Further research on 
the direct causes of the negative effect of non-executive directors would add to the current 
literature and may also be of use to other specialised industries such as banking and finance. 
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